Beware the Dance of the Gooney Birds
Politicians and engineers would better serve U.S. interests by trying to reach the same goal
- By John P. Bachner
- Oct 01, 2007
If there’s one thing that the various wake-of-
Katrina studies have shown us, it’s this: Politicians makes lousy engineers. The evidence
probably shows that engineers aren't very good politicians, either.
Politicians make lousy engineers because of the way they set budgets, scopes, and schedules—
project elements that are every bit as essential to a successful outcome as knowing how
to design something so it works well and lasts.
As happened with New Orleans’ hurricane defense system and continues to happen with
public works projects large and small, the government operates with an “if-it-ain’t-broke-don’tfix-
it” mentality. The problem is the definition of “broke.” Too often circumstances define it to
mean “a condition of predictable, catastrophic failure” that results in a loss of productivity, property,
money, and lives infinitely greater than what would have occurred had the government been
more proactive. Why doesn’t it move more quickly, especially when experienced agency personnel
can easily envision the problems that will occur if the town, county, city, or state waits for
“broke” to happen? Answer: Because of our elected officials. “We’ve got to keep taxes low,”
they aver, failing to add aloud, “even though it means our bridges and dams will come ever closer
to failure, our streets and highways will become even more plagued by gridlock, and our
water and wastewater systems will barely function; even though it means our inaction will ultimately
result in costs that will necessitate taxes that will be far higher than those that would
have been required to institute wise preventives.”
Politics as usual
And when opposing politicians hear something
like that, what can they say? “Vote for me. I’ll
raise taxes, but I will bring us
the infrastructure we need
for the future and that will
result in more income and
lower taxes”? They could say
it, but what’s more likely to
emerge from their mouths is
something like, “I have a
plan to actually lower taxes!”
Right. After all, who needs
teachers and cops?
The result of all this timehonored
flimflammery is a
hodge-podge approach to
infrastructure modernization,
replacement, and expansion.
Not enough money is on
hand to get the project done well, so it has to
be budgeted over several years, and no one is sure
that the money needed in year two or year three
will actually be there. The agency may select the
engineers it needs based more on fee than competence,
encouraging each to propose the least
it can live with and maybe a little less. But even
when qualifications-based selection is used, the
engineers still are likely to learn that the design
they develop will “cost too much to build;”
that is, more than the woefully inadequate budget
permits. And while folks are fighting over
who is responsible for that and what can be done
about it, a major failure of some kind occurs,
necessitating major repairs that sap infrastructure
budgets still more, forcing more schedule
extensions and even more design and construction
“adjustments,” also known as “quality cuts.”
What about the engineers who realize that
the government is taking a dangerous, wholly
nonengineering approach to the budgeting,
scoping, and scheduling process? Do they speak
up? Do they take their message to the people?
Do they say, “We’re going to have to do this
sooner or later, and the sooner we do it, the
less it will cost in the long run and the more it
will support the growth and economic vitality
that help better infrastructure pay for itself”? Of
course not. They say exactly what the Corps of
Engineers said to Congress, when Congress said,
“We want you to achieve a perfect result in New
Orleans, even though we’re not going to give
you the money you need to fulfill the scope that’s
required.” The Corps said, “Can do.”
Inadequate everything
In an ideal world, engineers would be more
politic, or “shrewdly tactful,” to achieve the results
needed to optimize public health, safety, and welfare.
Instead, they prefer not to make waves and
so agree to achieve what they know they cannot.
And the intensity of that problem seems to
be inversely proportional to the size of the agency
or jurisdiction involved, because the smaller the
jurisdiction or agency, the less
experienced its well-intentioned
representatives. They
know something is needed
and so venture forth to get it
done with an inadequate budget
and an inadequate scope.
At least three or four engineering
firms respond to such
jurisdictions’ and agencies’
requests for proposals, quotations,
or bids “because we
need the work.” Then, when
the selected firm delivers initial
plans and specifications,
it is told the design will cost
too much to construct,
requiring the firm to “go back to the drawing
board” and “value engineer” its original concept.
The engineers (if like most) will oblige but fail
to point out that the redesign, while it will
cost less to implement, will also entail far more
risk; that is, it probably will not function as effectively
or reliably as the original and, in fact, may
experience problems from the get-go.
When the construction documents finally
are made available to contractors, not one says
there’s something wrong with the plans and
specs. And which type of contractor will win
the award? Will it be a Type A or Type B? (Type
A contractors are fair about the extras they charge
for achieving the kind of quality work they’re
known for. Although they seldom are the low
bidders, they know and their customers know
that bidding is a farce; that the amount a public
agency actually pays to a general contractor
almost always exceeds the contractor’s bid. In
fact, when all is said and done, studies show that
Type A contractors’ prices usually are more reasonable
than Type Bs’, because the As do not
“low-ball” their projects to win assignment and
then earn a profit through change-order gamesmanship;
for example, by
• calling for changes that are not needed,
• not performing changes as proposed, and
• ignoring what the plans and specs actually
call for (“midnight changes”).
By contrast, Type B contractors love changeorder
gamesmanship and perennially low-ball
their bids. Others bid low, because they are
incompetent or from out of town and unaware
of local conditions that create important contingencies
they’ve ignored.
Gooney bird dancing
So which contractor will win the small jurisdiction’s
or agency’s assignment? Type A or Type
B? You know the answer: Gimme a B! And you
also know what happens from there. The new
whatever-it-is works fine as long as it doesn’t
have to be turned on. But when it is—poof!—
it doesn’t work the way it’s supposed to. And at
that point, everyone involved—the politicians,
the agency officials, the engineers, and the contractors—
begin “the dance of the gooney birds,”
pointing at one another while yelling at the top
of their lungs, “It’s not my fault. Blame them.”
And then come the lawyers. Which is why, of
all owners design professionals deal with, local
jurisdictions and agencies are those most likely
to sue. No one has the brass to tell them that
they cannot achieve what they need and want
with the budget, scope, and schedule they’ve
developed, so they’re disappointed, frustrated,
and angered when the inevitable occurs. So they
turn to their lawyers to “make things right,” and
“things” get infinitely worse from there. All
because politicians don’t know how to engineer
a project and engineers are not politic enough
to do what has to be done to get the project to
come out right—by somehow making the budget,
scope, and schedule genuinely sufficient.
I note frequently that ASFE has published
close to 100 case histories of things that go
wrong on projects. Just about none of the new
case histories ASFE is publishing relate anything
really new. It’s all about the same old bad stuff
being repeated by people who are new to the
process or by people who just never learn.
If you’re an engineer, you simply have to realize
that, if the budget, scope, and schedule are not
sufficient to support the kind of outcome the people
really need and want, they are not going to
get that outcome. If you accept the project anyway,
you know what the real outcome will be
(your blind optimism notwithstanding), and you
deserve to be part of it. (People who want something
in the worst way get it just that way.)
If you’re a politician, try standing up and saying,
“We’re going about this all wrong. The
sooner we do what should be done, the better
off we’re all going to be. And if we don’t do it
right, we’re not going to get what we want and,
when we finally do—if we finally do—it’s going
to cost us far more than it should have.”
What kind of a politician would say that?
Maybe an engineer running for office, probably
for the first time. Would he or she be elected?
I don’t know, but I can tell you this: When
you’re involved with a project that clearly has an
insufficient budget, scope, and schedule, be
awfully careful of what you do, no matter what
your role in the process. History is not on your
side. And it’s your risk.
This article originally appeared in the 10/01/2007 issue of Environmental Protection.
About the Author
John P. Bachner is executive vice president of ASFE/The Best People on Earth. ASFE is a not-for-profit trade association comprising geoprofessional, environmental, and civil engineering firms, design/build contractors, and educators.